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AbstrAct
In this research, an econometric with panel data using Ordinary 
least squares OLs model is constructed following the guidelines 
recommended by the EbA stress test methodology for 2016. the 
findings indicate that macroeconomic factors affecting defaults 
are the expected ones in the spanish credit institutions. However, 
loan impairments do not follow the patterns that a priori would be 
normal. Divergent is outcomes in defaults and impairments: the 
Non-Performing Loans (NPL) is pro-cyclical and impairment loss-
es are counter-cyclical.
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1. introduction
In recent years, there has been a generalized use and disclosure of the stress test. the aim is to provide security to financial markets, a sector that is signifi-
cantly affected by rumors[1]. stress tests provide transpar-
ency to the financial market and are an important tool for 
banking supervision [2]. However, their recent introduction 
and the complexity of the estimations have meant that 
some of their objectives are not being met. For example, 
Quijano [3] says that the publication of the results of the 
2009 bank stress test taken by the reserve had no impact 
on stock performance. However, the publication of the 
outcomes of the 2016 EU-wide stress test [4] conducted by 
the EbA caused a decrease of 5.1% in the European bank-
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ing sector and 7.1% in the spanish banking sector, despite 
having good results.
This paper focuses on this latter stress test, specifically, 
on the estimation of defaults and on the losses expected 
from defaults in the credit portfolio of customers. the 
study is based on spanish credit institutions. the meth-
odology will be used to develop an econometric model to 
estimate the probability of default (PD) and the loss given 
default (LGD), following the 2016 EU-Wide stress test 
– Methodological Note [5]. For this purpose, data from the 
spanish economy and spanish credit institutions are used 
from 2004 to 2015.
the aim is to provide a new tool for stress tests in or-
der to carefully estimate losses due to the non-payment of 
customer credit. These losses are usually the most signifi-
cant, in terms of quantity, that credit institutions suffer.
the results may be used for supervision purposes by 
investors and, especially, by the credit institutions them-
selves in order to estimate future losses from defaults on 
loans, using the methodology recommended by the EbA 
for calculating the losses produced in the investment port-
folios of credit institutions.
2. Background and literature review
the stress testing were encouraged by the basel Accords, 
whose first version was approved by the Bank for Interna-
tional settlements (bIs) in 1988. based on these rules, the 
stress tests are a common tool in the risks management to 
assess the potential impact of economic [6,7,8,9].
Agreeing to til schuermann and Nyoka[10,11], one of 
the consequences of the recent financial crisis is that the 
ordinary methods, such as regulatory capital ratios, are 
no longer consistent. this lack of confidence has made 
that in recent years, it has increased significantly use and 
disclosure of the stress test. the goal to offer security to 
financial markets, a sector that is which is very influenced 
affected by rumours [1].
Investors requirement reliable information to study the 
opportunity of investing in a credit entities, mainly when 
it may be subject to loans loss provisions [12]. 
the analysis of the impact to loan loss provisions on 
the Spanish financial system is not new and has been the 
object of interest in other periods. Freixas et al. [13] studied 
on the period of 1973-1992 using variables such as GDP 
and cPI. Fernandez de Lis et al. [14] analysed the determi-
nants of Default in the dates of 1963-1999 and pointed 
to GDP as the most significant determinant. Delgado and 
saurina [15] studied in the period 1982-2001 the GDP, 
interest, level of debt and asset prices in banks and sav-
ings banks. More recently, Foos et al. [16] study sixteen 
European countries including spain, affirm that credit 
growth entails an increase in loss provisions. climent 
and Pavia [17] study spanish credit institutions in the 
period of 2004-2011. Among the most relevant variables 
that have had a significant impact on the increase of de-
linquency are, among variables, house prices, unemploy-
ment rates and  property investment.
3. Material and Methods
3.1 Sample and Variables
the sample was chosen from just one country, spain, be-
cause the peculiarities of what each country does with the 
data obtained from the credit institutions of one country 
are not optimal for the rest. Evidence of this is that the hy-
pothetical situations (scenarios) are defined independently 
for each of the countries. In addition, if all countries are 
included, the heterogeneity of the data could offset op-
posing characteristics and distort the econometric models. 
However, the results can be used for other countries by 
replicating the model and adapting it to the peculiarities of 
each one of them.
table one shows the variables used in the models and 
their description, And table two shows the correlation be-
tween them.
table 1. Variables and Descripction
Dependent variables: Description
PD Probability ratio of default of the loan portfolio 
LGD Loan loss provisions for Probability of default
Explanatory variables: Description
HIcP-var Harmonized index of consumer prices
Long-term interest ten year interest on public debt
Unemployment-var Variation in the unemployment rate
Property prices residential and commercial property prices
real GDP real gross domestic product
3.2. empirical Methods
the methodology used is that recommended in the 2016 
EU-Wide stress test - EbA Methodological Note (2016). 
Note 29 says: "the EU-wide stress test is conducted on 
the assumption of a static balance sheet." thus, the data 
from the credit institutions will be that which is included 
in their financial statements and management report. Note 
33 says: "the approach of the exercise is a constrained 
bottom-up stress test – i.e. banks are required to project 
the impact of the defined scenarios but are subject to strict 
constraints, as well as to a thorough review by competent 
authorities." therefore, the model will be built with the 
aim of allowing spanish credit institutions to estimate im-
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pairment losses on loans to customers so that the authori-
ties can supervise.
In the EbA methodological note 40 it states: "the esti-
mation of impairments and translation to available capital 
requires the use of statistical methods and includes the 
following main steps: (i) estimating starting values of the 
risk parameters, (ii) estimating the impact of the scenarios 
on the risk parameters, and (iii) computing impairment 
flows as the basis for provisions that affect the P&L." 
Note 88 reads: "Likewise, for the estimation of projected 
parameters, as a general principle, banks should use mod-
els rather than resort to benchmarks to determine stressed 
PDpit and LGDpit parameters (under both the baseline 
and the adverse scenario). However, banks' models will 
be assessed by competent authorities against minimum 
standards in terms of econometric soundness and re-
sponsiveness of the risk parameters to ensure the model 
specification results in a prudent outcome." Accordingly, 
an econometric model is estimated to estimate the PDpit 
and LGDpit parameters. Other authors like bertsatos and 
sakellaris[18], also utilized dynamic and static econometric 
models for estimating the stress test.
the approach proposed in the 2016 EU-Wide stress 
test – Methodological Note EbA, (2016) to estimate the 
flow of impairments on new defaulted assets at time t+1 is 
given by:
Gross Imp Flow New(t+1) = Exp(t) x PDpit(t+1) x LG-
DpitNEW(t+1) Equation 1
where Exp (t) is the exposure, in our case the loans 
granted to customers, PDpit(t + 1) are the NPLs caused 
by the exposure in year t + 1, and LGDpitNEW(t+1) are the 
estimated impairment losses for the year t + 1.
therefore, two models are estimated, one for the de-
faults (PD) and another for the loan impairments (LGD). 
the dependent variables are PD and LGD and the explan-
atory variables are those that are defined in the adverse 
macro-financial scenario for the EbA 2016 EU-wide bank 
stress testing exercise[19]: long-term interest rates, real 
GDP, HICP inflation, unemployment rate, and residential 
and commercial property prices.
the data sample includes the years 2004-2015. the 
dependent variables, PD and LGD, were obtained from 
the financial statements and management reports of prac-
tically all the spanish credit institutions (banks, savings 
banks and credit unions), 75 different entities in the 12 
periods. thus, the models are estimated using unbalanced 
panel data, by ordinary least squares, since not all the en-
tities cover the 12 periods. For the explanatory variables 
we have used data from Eurostat, the bank of spain, the 
spanish National Institute of statistics and the Ministry of 
Development of spain.4
4. empirical results
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the two dependent vari-
ables during the study period.
Figure 1. Evolution of the Dependent Variables
In the contrasts made to the data, the unit root hypoth-
esis has been accepted in two explanatory variables, the 
HIcP and the residential and commercial property prices. 
to avoid this problem, these variables have been included 
in the models in differences. Also, the dependent variables 
PD and LGD are cointegrated of order 1 c(1), so in the 
two models these variables will be included with a delay 
of one year, making the models dynamic. Furthermore, 
in 2012, a new financial regulation was implemented in 
table 2. correlation between the Variables
 LGD PD HIcP interest Unemployment Property prices GDP
LGD 0.169       
PD -0.008*** 0.003      
HIcP 0.206*** -0.020*** 9.081***     
interest -0.000 0.001** -0.002** 0.001    
Unemployment -0.027*** 0.002*** -0.071** 0.001*** 0.054   
Property prices 14.759*** -4.533*** -37.752*** 0.271*** 18.510*** 42732.55  
GDP 0.004*** -0.001*** 0.047*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 2.435*** 0.000619
Significance levels *,**,*** at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
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spain that greatly affected the impairment losses. ① to 
take account of this circumstance, a dummy variable is 
included in the LGD model that takes value 1 in 2012 and 
0 for all other periods.
thus, two models are proposed:
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4Unemployment𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽5𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6Real GDP𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   Model 1
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4Unemployment𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽5𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6Real GDP𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   Model 2
In neither of the models does residual autocorrelation 
exist (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. residual autocorrelation
For heteroscedasticity models, they were estimated us-
ing the robust method of White and cross-section weights.
table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables 
used:
table 4 shows the Vector Autoregressive, and the table 
5 shows impulse response functions
table 4. Vector autoregression
 PD LGD
PD(-1)
0.936 0.185988
(0.060) (0.053)
[ 15.519] [ 3.475]
PD(-2)
0.055 0.030
(0.068) (0.054)
[ 0.813] [ 0.555]
HIcP-var
0.001 -0.019
(0.001) (0.009)
[ 0.120] [-2.165]
Long-term interest
1.005 10.101
(0.157) (2.741)
[ 6.387] [ 3.684]
Unemployment-var
0.0320 -0.510
(0.004) (0.090)
[ 6.515] [-5.635]
Property prices
-0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
[-3.639] [-1.286]
real GDP
-0.006 6.667
(0.112) (1.335)
[-0.056] [ 4.993]
 Adj. r-squared 0.866921 0.257688
 F-statistic 413.5758 22.98568
 standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
PD LGD HIcP-var Long-term interest Unemployment-var Property prices real GDP
Mean 4.39% 40.20% -87.0% 4.09% 9.07% 1,805.52 € 1.76%
Median 2.47% 29.79% -3.23% 4.10% -2.60% 1,843.00 € 3.17%
Maximum 37.35% 551.46% 200.0% 5.85% 58.76% 2,071.00 € 4.17%
Minimum 0.07% -12.43% -1150.0% 1.74% -16.51% 1,459.00 € -3.57%
std. Dev. 5.26% 41.16% 301.63% 0.80% 23.31% 206.91 € 2.49%
Observations 531 531 531 531 531 531 531
table 3. Descriptive statistics of the variables
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table 5. Impulse response functions
Impulse response functions PD Impulse response functions LGD
the results of the model econometric are shown in ta-
ble 6.
table 6. Econometric models
Model 1. PD Model 2. LGD
c
-0.034** 1.600
(0.014) (0.360)
HIcP
0.001** -2.025**
(0.000) (0.010)
Long-term interest
0.656*** 1.999
(0.136) (2.002)
Unemployment
0.023*** -0.380***
(0.004) (0.079)
Property prices
0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
real GDP
-0.219 6.114***
(0.143) (2.130)
PD(-1)
LGD(-1)
0.960*** 0.331***
(0.027) (0.030)
Dummy 2012
0.394***
(0.028)
Adjusted r-squared 0.938 0.784
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.084 2.206
F-statistic 1144.231 236.105
Significance levels *,**,*** at the 1%, 5% and 10% respec-
tively. robust standard errors between parentheses. 
the impact on PD and LGD of the variables indicated 
by the EbA in stress test scenarios are:
regarding the probability of default (PD), there exists 
considerable inertia of the dependent variable over the 
next year. With regard to other variables, the increase in 
the long-term interest rates produces an increase in PD; 
the same happens with unemployment and to a much 
lesser extent with the HIcP. the only variable that causes 
a decrease in PD is the increase in real GDP, although its 
significance level is 0.12. And finally, the residential and 
commercial property prices variable is not statistically 
significant and, in addition, its coefficient is 0.
turning to the LGD, the results are not the same, or 
similar. While there is also dependent variable inertia, it 
is much less, the coefficient being 0.33 compared to 0.96 
for the PD. the increase in the HIcP and the Unemploy-
ment decreases the LGD. the dummy variable has been 
significant with a coefficient of 0.39. the only variable 
that reduces the LGD with its increase is the real GDP. 
The price of housing continues with the same coefficient, 
0, and is not statistically significant, with the long-term 
interest not being statistically significant either.
6. Discussion
the results obtained for the PD are expected because it is 
logical that both the increase in unemployment and rising 
interest rates would involve an increase in the PD. the 
same happens with the real GDP; if this parameter is in-
creased it is logical that the PD would decrease. However, 
the results obtained for the LGD are not as logical. this 
circumstance can be seen in Figure 1. the graph shows 
that when the PD increases, the LGP decreases, and there 
is no reason for it to be that way. In the econometric mod-
el it is found that when the economy is growing (increase 
in real GDP and lower unemployment), the LGD grows, 
just the opposite of the results obtained in the model of the 
probability of defaults. In this case, a smoothing effect of 
the results occurs, agreeing with other studies [20]. It is also 
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significant that the level of inertia of the dependent vari-
able (LGD) is three times lower than in the model of the 
PD. For all this we can say that the effects of the macro-
economic variables are not the same in the LGD as in the 
PD, and they are also not the expected ones. In addition, 
one must take into account the possible legislative chang-
es, or other events that may affect the dependent variables 
studied, as was demonstrated with the legislative changes 
of 2012.
7. Direction for Future Work
the investigation should be deepened in three areas: First-
ly, in the smoothing that has been detected and its possible 
causes. secondly, the effects of the internal variables on 
the PD and LGD should be investigated, as they are likely 
to have a significant effect. The PD and LGD may not be 
the same in solvent credit institutions with high profits as 
in entities in economic difficulties. Finally, it is not logical 
that the significant change in the price of housing does not 
affect the study variables, so this aspect should also be 
looked into more closely.
Annotation
① this is an example of the uniqueness that each country 
can have.
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